EXHIBIT G

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

PETTER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Michigan corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

File No. 1:07-CV-1033

HYDRO ENGINEERING, INC., a Utah corporation, and HYDRO ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY CO., a Utah limited liability company,

Defendants.

<u>Markman Hearing</u>

Before

THE HONORABLE GORDON J. QUIST United States District Judge December 17, 2008

Kevin W. Gaugier, CSR-3065
U.S. District Court Reporter

APPEARANCES

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Grand Rapids, Michigan 1 December 17, 2008 2 3 10:06 a.m. 4 5 6 PROCEEDINGS 7 8 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. Good morning, 9 everybody else. No, you may be seated. 10 We're here in the case of Petter Investments, Inc., 11 and others against Hydro Engineering, Inc. and others, case 12 number 1:07-CV-1033, time set for several motions, Markman 13 hearing, motion for summary judgment on equitable estoppel, 14 and motion for summary judgment on the merits. Can I have the 15 appearance of counsel, please? 16 MR. RATH: Yes, Your Honor. Eugene Rath from Price 17 Heneveld for plaintiff, Petter Investments. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. 19 MR. FOSTER: Brett Foster appearing on behalf of 20 defendants. 21 MR. MILLER: Mark Miller appearing on defendants' 22 behalf. 23 MR. GAFFIN: Rick Gaffin for defendants. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Who's going to be the primary 25 spokesperson for the defendants?

MR. FOSTER: We're going to break it up, Your Honor, if you will allow. I will handle the summary judgment motion. Mr. Miller will handle claim construction on the Hydro Engineering patents.

THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do is change what I thought initially because there's so much here. I mean, every little term and everything we could fight about and we'd probably be here for the rest of our lives, so -- and I've got other things to do, obviously.

I have worked hard on it, but I'm really prepared on the '592 patent and somewhat prepared on the Hydro patents. And regarding the Markman hearing on the Hydro patents, it's my proposal that rather than listen to you and your not knowing where I'm coming from is to give you some of my tentative thoughts regarding the claim construction as to those patents, that's the Hydro patents, the '591 and '749 patents, and then have another time where you can appear by telephone or in person to argue with me about that. Otherwise I think we would be spinning our wheels a lot here today because I'd forget at the end what we talked about at the beginning.

Having said that, I'm wondering whether or not it wouldn't be possible for the parties to really focus me in on the claims in the Hydro patents that they think are critical. In other words, rather than argue about things that may or may

not be critical, and ofttimes in these cases it's been my experience that, you know, patent lawyers like to fight about everything, but some things really don't make a big difference, and it seems that they all sort of -- they start out with twenty things they want to argue about and then you finally get to the final pretrial or something and say, Well, Your Honor, there are only three or four things that really make a difference here. So -- and I'm talking to you so that you can respond to me.

So my thought is to give you like fourteen days to get me focused in on -- although I have read it; I've read them and I've got some preliminary thoughts -- to focus me in on what you think are the really critical claims in the Hydro patents. And then I will give you tentative, and I mean tentative, thoughts regarding claim construction within another fourteen days, and then you can handle it from then on as you wish, either another oral argument, and in these cases oral argument is not really very effective, and I'll get into that in a minute too, and then, you know, make a decision.

MR. RATH: I think that's fine, Your Honor. A couple things. You wanted to hear from both parties, I

Mr. Rath, what's your gut reaction to that?

assume, within fourteen days?

THE COURT: Yes, yes. And if you guys -- I mean, you guys are good lawyers. You practice in this area a lot.

Talk to each other and say, you know, Gene or whatever he calls you, you know, let's focus in on this. This is the critical issue. Like I think vacuum pump is the critical issue in the '792 patent.

MR. RATH: Right.

THE COURT: Right. So this is what we are talking about, and then I can give you tentative conclusions on all of them. But if you focus me in on those, that would be helpful, I think, to get you guys going.

MR. RATH: We will do that, Your Honor, and we received some exhibits earlier this week that I think is going to resolve a couple issues at least, moot them, so I think that will narrow it down too somewhat. But we will certainly do that for you.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Foster, what's your reaction to that?

MR. FOSTER: Let me --

THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Miller, go ahead.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, with regard to the Hydro patents, my argument today, I was prepared to do a pretty minimal argument that would just be saying in our opinion here are the critical three or four things in the Hydro patents that should be focused on. So were you asking us to kind of give us -- give you that today a little bit?

THE COURT: No, I don't want anything on the Hydro

patents today. I'm sorry that you spent your time coming here, but nonetheless, maybe it's good that you can see where I'm coming from. But talk to Mr. Rath, and if you guys can get together and file it within fourteen days, you can file it jointly, you can file it separately. It doesn't make any difference. Joint seems to make more sense. But these are the things that are really critical, and we'll really focus in on those, and then, Mr. Miller, you can come here and Mr. Foster can stay home, whatever, instead of both of you here. So whatever, so we will do it that way, then.

MR. MILLER: Perfect.

THE COURT: And then we can pay close attention to those things. I mean, I've got a list here that goes on and on and on with all of this stuff, and by the time we got three-quarters of the way through, like I said earlier, I'd forget what we talked about at the beginning. But if I do it that way, then I will be more focused on it.

All right. Let's go forward, then, with the '592 patent, and I want the parties to address first the claim for equitable estoppel, and I guess, Mr. Foster, you're going to talk about that. What is not going to be helpful today is going to be the presentation you planned to make, you know, the brilliant oratory and everything else. What will be more helpful to me is if you could answer just a couple of questions.

And by the way, my hearing is shot, so it would be helpful if you -- since November 5. The court reporter and my law clerks are sick of hearing about it. My wife is sick of hearing about it, but you guys ought to know. Talk into the speakerphones. It would be very helpful.

You would agree with me, I think, that equitable estoppel by its very definition is a matter of the Court's conscience, and the very word "equitable" demands that the Court, you know, apply a fair -- make a fair decision based on the facts. And I have to tell you that there was that seven-year delay that Petter didn't take any activity, but I don't see how, considering the fact that Hydro says, well, it's been making these products since 1980, how Hydro was at all adversely affected by this seven years of silence. I'm going to get some water here. Maybe you could respond to that.

MR. FOSTER: You're ready for me to do that now?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. FOSTER: Okay.

THE COURT: Then I'm going to give Mr. Rath a chance to get right up there and say that's wrong.

MR. FOSTER: Your Honor, I think you've focused on an important point, and I completely agree with the concept that this is equitable. It's not going to be a jury issue; it's going to be your issue.

In regard to the prejudice, I think what you have is you have the ten letters that went back and forth, a few in 1998, more in 2000 going back and forth. You have a drop-dead deadline of October 1. Both sides understood and Mr. Petter testified that he would have thought that Hydro should expect a lawsuit, and Hydro said we expected a lawsuit if we didn't satisfy them.

THE COURT: But it didn't do anything. I mean, it went ahead and got its own patents.

MR. FOSTER: What it did --

THE COURT: And it kept manufacturing the product. I mean, you know --

MR. FOSTER: That's exactly right, Your Honor.

That's exactly right. They kept doing what they were doing that they accused them of infringement with respect to.

That's the issue.

When you have back in 2000 allegations in the letters from Mr. Rath saying, Your Hydropad products look like they're similar to ours, insinuate infringement, offer a license, we don't say, We have any interest in a license. We say, We don't think we have to stop doing anything. We're doing the same thing we've been doing for a long time. Should we stop? Now we get to the point we get a lawsuit filed and there's been increase of employees, there's been increase in profits, there's been capital investments, all toward

continuing to do what we've been doing.

Now, I think to try to mitigate a little bit against the current of our equitable estoppel argument, they've more narrowly tailored their arguments of infringement today as we sit here, as we'll discuss later.

THE COURT: Oh, really?

MR. FOSTER: And so that's the issue. So you start with Hydropads. Hydropads is the universe of pads they make. We go forward, we move forward, we have capital investment, we substantially increase the size of our employees, we work forward, and I believe that the case law talks about in terms of reliance it's sufficient if they lull you into a feeling that you're not going to be sued and you can continue on with business as usual. That's what we did.

THE COURT: Well, where did they threaten to sue you? I mean, they asked you to stop. I went through the letters, and maybe my notes aren't as thorough as they should be, but the last letter I have before -- well, before you got your patent '591 in 2004 is -- and quite frankly, these are handwritten notes that are quite cryptic -- 9/6/2000, Petter to Hydro, wants more detailed information regarding sales prior to 9/97, and then Hydro responds, no material change. That's it.

MR. FOSTER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: That's not a threat of a lawsuit or

anything.

MR. FOSTER: Well, I guess what you have to look at, first of all, the first letter that came out says we've spent a lot of money. This is Exhibit 1 to --

THE COURT: Yeah, but that was even before they got a patent.

MR. FOSTER: Certainly.

THE COURT: My notes on that say Petter warns Hydro that it appeared that Hydro's system would violate several claims in a pending patent application, will pursue whatever means are available. Is that what you're talking about?

MR. FOSTER: Yes, okay. And the testimony of Mr. Petter that we've cited to indicates that that meant -- "all means necessary" meant when the patent issued, taking them to court, and that was his testimony. That was his understanding. That was our understanding. So you have the testimony of our guys saying, We thought that meant when the patent issued, they were going to sue, and their guy testifies, We meant that we were going to sue. That was part of the "all means necessary." So you've got undisputed facts supporting that.

Now, I think that's just the starting point, and that gives the frame of reference to both parties that a suit may be coming. The patent issues, there's exchanges of letters, and then we get down to the October 1 --

THE COURT: Did they ever threaten a lawsuit once they got the patent? I mean, they couldn't sue you when they sent that letter on 5/15/98. Then the patent issues. They never threatened to sue you after that.

MR. FOSTER: Well, you get to the final letter, Your Honor, which was before -- this is the last letter. This is in October of 2000.

THE COURT: All right. Let me -- October, okay.

MR. FOSTER: And it basically has a drop-dead deadline of October 1. Give us more answers to our questions by October 1, 2000.

And what's the testimony of Mr. Petter about that?

He said -- this is in Exhibit L to our papers. He says: "You previously informed Hydro that you'd take any means necessary to enforce your intellectual property rights, correct?"

Answer: "Correct." "Would it fair to assume if you're sitting in Hydro Engineering's standpoint that if they don't provide something, they may well get sued? That would be a fair understanding, wouldn't it?" And this is concerning the October 1 deadline. Answer: "I would be concerned if I were them, yes." Question: "Concerned about getting sued?"

Answer: "Yes."

That's the testimony of their witness in respect to the October 1 deadline. It's exactly what they intended to convey. That's exactly the way it was taken. The witnesses

on both sides of the case testified they expected that Hydro would be sued if we didn't do what we needed to to solve the issue.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FOSTER: We responded, and they do nothing for seven years. So with all respect, Your Honor, while they don't in the letter expressly say we're going to sue you, the import of what they did according to the testimony of witnesses on both sides is initially when he said whatever means necessary, that intended to convey the idea that they may be going to court.

THE COURT: Maybe, yeah.

MR. FOSTER: And the October 1 deadline clearly, he says, I'd be concerned about getting sued if I were you. Our guys said, We were concerned about getting sued. When both sides agree to the interpretation of that and both sides understand that there's going to be a lawsuit, I don't think there's a question of fact that prevents you from concluding that they threatened a lawsuit; and when they didn't go forward with it and Hydro continued to move forward with business as usual, that you have the situation that equitable estoppel — for which equitable estoppel should afford relief.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Rath?

MR. RATH: A few thoughts in responding to what Mr.

Foster said and then I'd be happy to answer any questions you have for me, Your Honor.

You know, Hydro's coming in here asking for extraordinary relief, okay, and I think you've hit the nail right on the head here. You know, they have to prove three things. They have to prove that there was some misleading communication and that that had to happen after the patent issued, okay.

None of the letters that I sent to them threatened litigation in any way. In fact, the first letter I sent said we're willing to entertain the possibility of granting you a license and we'd like to resolve this in an amicable manner, and it never changed, including the September letter that I sent. What happened there was the Petters were getting tired of feeling like they were getting run around. We kept asking for information, asking for information. Well, it's been destroyed. We don't have that.

And so these deadlines -- or the one deadline that was implemented was simply to keep the thing going so the Petters could decide how they were going to proceed, and at that time they made a business decision that, you know, we're not getting anywhere with this. Why spend money on all these letters and time and energy? Let's just go on and do our business.

The other thing you touched on, Your Honor, was how

was Hydro adversely affected? Nothing has been quantified here or even attempted to be quantified. They say, Well, you know, we went ahead and did business as usual and we had a loss and relied on your statements. Well, what loss was it? Where is the potential increase in damages? Where is the loss in their business or anything else that they got as a result of this so-called reliance on the misleading conduct that they claim happened? There is none. They've provided nothing, no specific evidence to show, Hey, we lost a million bucks. We're looking at a million dollars in damages. There's nothing like that.

They also claim there's been a loss in evidence. Well, what evidence? Okay, apparently Mr. McCormick can remember that he received a letter in 1998 even though Mr. Petter doesn't remember sending it, but somehow the --

THE COURT: Yeah, that's the letter that maybe came out of discovery as distinguished from out of their -- from you instead of them?

MR. RATH: Correct, correct. That letter did not come out of their files at all. And he has the memory back to 1998 that he received that letter, but yet there's somehow a loss of memory about some other thing that we don't even know about. Again, there's nothing specific pointed to that, Hey, we lost this evidence, and therefore, we're adversely affected by it.

The last thing I want to touch on, Your Honor, is that 1998 letter. You are correct that Petters did not have a patent at that time. When you go through the patent application process, you don't know what the scope of the patent's going to be until it issues, and so there's no way of knowing really until it issues about whether their product would be covered by the claims of that patent or not. It was merely to put Hydro on notice. Hey, we got a patent application on file. You should beware.

THE COURT: All right.

Thirty seconds?

MR. FOSTER: May I, just very quickly?

In regard to prejudice, among other things, even in respect to the configurations they assert that are infringing today, they claim that there are two installations that are infringing. Had we known what their position is, had they sued and had they narrowed their position, then we would not be here today because we would have configured the systems differently, and we wouldn't have sales in 2005 and 2007 that infringe. That's prejudice.

THE COURT: Well, of course, at this point in time I take all the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that happens to be Petter. And I think that there are sufficient facts here that I'm not going to grant the motion, and I'll go through a more thorough

analysis in a minute.

But just keep in mind the standard that we have for summary judgment. I mean, you've made the motion. I'm not going to grant summary judgment for either side, but as I said, the facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, then the counter-defendant, Petter, at this point in time. All right.

MR. FOSTER: Fair enough. I had a couple other points that I'd be happy to make very quickly, but if you've already made that decision, then we'll move on.

THE COURT: Yeah, okay. And let me give you the grounds for it. Bear with me as I try to do this.

A patentee is equitably estopped to assert infringement of its patent if: one, it misleads the alleged infringer through conduct, such as words, action, inaction, or silence when it had a duty to speak, to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer, and that's the prime test we're talking about; the alleged infringer relies on that conduct; and the alleged infringer will be prejudiced by its reliance if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim. That's <u>Scholle Corporation against Blackhawk Molding Company</u>, Inc., 133 F.3d 1469, 1471, Federal Circuit, 1998.

Petter warned Hydro in May 1998 that it would infringe its pending '792 patent, and informed Hydro that

Petter had forwarded the matter to its attorney and would, quote, "pursue whatever means were available," end quote, to protect its intellectual property. Petter wrote Hydro again a couple of months after it received the '792 patent in February 2000. That letter suggested that Hydro was infringing the '792 patent, stated that Petter preferred an amicable resolution, and raised the possibility of granting Hydro a license. The parties exchanged information about their products for several months. On September 6, 2000, Petter requested Hydro to provide more information about its product line by October 1, 2000, and communications ceased shortly thereafter.

Hydro contends that Petter threatened immediate litigation and subsequently lulled Hydro into believing it had abandoned its claim through seven years of silence. While threatening conduct followed by silence may establish estoppel, silence will not suffice, quote, "unless there was a clear duty to speak or the patentee's continued silence reenforces the defendant's inference from the plaintiff's known acquiescence that the defendant will be unmolested. Furthermore, this inference must be the only possible" one to merit summary judgment. That's A.C. Aukerman Company v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1043-44, Federal Circuit, 1992.

To demonstrate reliance, the parties must have had,

quote, "a relationship or communication that lulls the infringer into a sense of security," end quote. That's Aukerman at 1043. Petter made no affirmative representation that it had abandoned any claim against it, nor did it remain silent when it had a duty to speak. Hydro's reliance on Petter's silence, then, does not rise to the point where summary judgment should be granted, and it's a good question whether it was reasonable if there was reliance.

In <u>Aukerman</u>, the Federal Circuit held that the plaintiff's nine years' silence after setting a deadline for the defendant to take a license created a reasonable inference that the defendant could use the invention unmolested. In that case, the defendant had informed the plaintiff that another party was responsible for any infringement.

In <u>Scholle</u>, the plaintiff was engaged in a number of lawsuits against alleged infringers. I think you have that cite. If you don't, I'll give it to you. The defendant informed the plaintiff it had developed a product it believed did not infringe the plaintiff's patent and that it would market the product unless the plaintiff informed the defendant that it believed defendant's product infringed. That's Scholle, 133 F.3d at 1472. The court held that this course of conduct established the plaintiff's duty to speak and that the defendant reasonably inferred from the plaintiff's silence that it would not be sued. Same cite.

The affirmative conduct that led the defendants in the aforementioned cases to conclude from the patentees' silence that they were abandoning any claims against them is not present here. Hydro did not inform Petter that it would proceed unless Petter determined Hydro had infringed Petter's patent, and there was no suggestion that Petter regarded someone else liable for the alleged infringement.

The Federal Circuit has held that silence following an attempt to negotiate a license was insufficient. That's Meyers against Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308-09, Federal Circuit, 1992. Although the delay was longer here, the facts are somewhat similar to those in Meyers. And let me emphasize once again that these are equitable matters and one judge's sense of fairness sometimes is different from another judge's sense of fairness, but we still are guided to a large extent by precedent from the Court of Appeals, and maybe sometimes even from other district judges and sometimes even from ourselves. We don't even have to follow our own decisions, by the way.

Hydro did ask Petter whether it was correct in its belief that it could continue operating if its activities long predated the '792 patent. However, the evidence suggests that Petter continued to request information because it had not determined that Hydro was correct. Petter never suggested it believed that question had been resolved in Hydro's favor.

Hydro's assertion that Petter threatened an imminent lawsuit is unpersuasive. Although Petter stated it would pursue whatever means were available to protect its interest, Hydro knew at the time that Petter's patent was merely pending. A suit for infringement was not possible at that time. When the parties renewed communication after the '792 patent was issued, Petter did not threaten suit, but it instead explained that it preferred an amicable solution.

Although the Federal Circuit held that threatened litigation was not a prerequisite to estoppel by silence in ABB Robotics against GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 52 F.3d 1062, Federal Circuit, 1995, the parties in ABB Robotics had a more extensive relationship than Petter and Hydro. GMFanuc's parent company was the plaintiff's largest customer. GMFanuc knew the plaintiff was not actively marketing the subject matter of the patent, and furthermore, the parties continued negotiating other licensing arrangements and the plaintiff licensed other patents to the defendant.

Hydro and Petter do not have the extensive relationship that justified equitable estoppel in <u>ABB</u>

Robotics. In fact, they happen to be competitors and not any business relationships with each other, other perhaps than this lawsuit and perhaps some competition in trying to sell their respective car wash systems.

Hydro has not provided sufficient evidence that it

relied on its belief that Petter had abandoned any claim against it. Hydro contends it invested substantial capital to expand its operations, significantly increasing sales and profits from its Hydropad products. However, when initially warned of potential infringement in 1998, Hydro replied that it had been selling wash pads since 1980 and asserted that the '792 patent would be unenforceable against Hydro because its allegedly infringing activities long predated Petter's patent application.

This evidence suggests that Hydro would have continued its capital investment even if it believed Petter would continue to pursue its claim. Hydro had been conducting business in this field for years. There is no indication it suspended operations when it was contacted by Petter only to resume them after a time because it believed Petter had relinquished its claim. It appears that Hydro merely continued along a course it had charted years before receiving any of these letters. At the least, whether Hydro relied on its belief in expanding its business operations is a genuine issue of material fact which you can look at again later, but at this point in time I don't think that there's been any clear showing for summary judgment, and that's the reason for the ruling that I announced earlier.

So there we are on that, which brings us then to the claim construction of the '792 patent. On that, I think the

critical term is "vacuum pump," but I'm delighted to hear that the parties have narrowed the issues somewhat.

Where are we? What is this narrowing you're talking about, Mr. Foster, if it's true? And I'm not saying, you know, that you would mislead. I'm just saying --

MR. FOSTER: I think that we're talking about the Hydropads that are accused of infringement. When Mr. Rath wrote letters back in 2000, he said, We think your Hydropad product may be similar to our product and may infringe, and so that's really what Mr. Miller was prepared to talk about.

THE COURT: I see, okay.

MR. FOSTER: From our perspective we completely agree that "vacuum pump" is the key limitation, and frankly, we believe it should be dispositive. While we raised three other elements, we think the vacuum pump should be the beginning and end of things.

THE COURT: Okay. Just stand right there if you would. Mr. Rath, why don't you stand next to him so that I can zero in on this here, and it might go back and forth.

Do you agree with him, Mr. Rath, that the claim construction of "vacuum pump" might be dispositive?

MR. RATH: I think it --

THE COURT: If I buy his construction, that the case is over with, because then if I buy his construction, then I go on to summary judgment. Assuming that I buy his

construction of the claim, and I've got the claim written out here somewhere, do you agree then that at least you're in big trouble on summary judgment?

MR. RATH: I am a patent attorney and I hate to concede anything, but this time I will because I do think it is dispositive if Hydro gets the construction it wants because I don't think there's an equivalence argument here, and so I really think that the infringement issue would be decided.

THE COURT: And let me, you can -- let me tell you I have real trouble with your argued construction. First of all, I don't know the difference -- you talk about your proposed construction uses the word "suck", which to me implies some kind of a vacuum at some point in time. I mean, all pumps based on my one year of physics in high school and one year in college, basic stuff, all pumps suck a little bit. I mean, a piston pump sucks. A rotary pump sucks. They all suck as these chambers open and close.

But a vacuum pump sucks differently, doesn't it?

Because the piston pump as I understand it operates directly on the water while the vacuum pump operates on air, and then there's a sucking, but there's more than that. It doesn't operate directly on the water.

So I have a -- and then you have that, you know, where you try to distinguish the Carter -- I could through all this bit by bit, but I'll give you a chance to respond to all

this. Then you have your distinction of the Carter patent, 1 2 and it looks to me like that distinction, that long paragraph 3 says exactly what Mr. Foster wants me to say. This is your 4 big opportunity. 5 MR. RATH: I think in that paragraph we definitely 6 limited it, okay. And if I can back up a little bit, "vacuum 7 pump" is --8 THE COURT: But you say you limited it only to the 9 placement. I don't read that at all. You also limited it --10 you limited it to the placement and you limited it to the 11 operation. That's the way I read it. 12 MR. RATH: I agree with you that we limited it to 13 the operation, but I don't agree that it goes as far as Mr. 14 Foster wants it to go to, and that's where we disagree, okay. 15 And I think the operation and placement go hand-in-hand, okay. But really what I believe that the construction should 16 17 be is that you need to pull water, it's a pump that pulls 18 water through the tube, okay, from the drainage fitting to the 19 filtering system, and that's the end of the story. 20 THE COURT: Well, okay. Tell me how their pump does 21 that. You say pull. Do you say push, Mr. Foster? 22 MR. FOSTER: That's correct. 23 THE COURT: Yeah. He says push. 24 MR. FOSTER: That's absolutely right, correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me how it's pulled, and tell

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me how it's pulled with a sucking.

MR. RATH: Okay. We provided you a video, I believe, and a declaration from Mr. Doug Petter that showed just how that pump sucks water from a trough over to the pump box. And what happens is, I don't want to get into too much detail, but basically we're talking about pressure differentials. Vacuum and where we're talking about gravity or sucking, really we're talking about pressure on this side where the trough is, okay, and where there's a head of water plus atmospheric pressure, gravity, and a pressure on this side. Well, what happens is gravity will cause or atmospheric pressure will cause that water to flow.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. RATH: Okay. But once you put the pump in that Hydro's using, it flows faster. It's creating that suction.

THE COURT: Of course. Of course.

MR. RATH: Okay. So it's not a pushing; it's pulling. It's pulling that water.

THE COURT: But it's not a vacuum pump. In other words, it's operating by gravity, not by the sucking of air out of a chamber, and that's the point that you have with a vacuum pump.

For example, you've got two chambers and they're ten-gallon chambers. They're side by side with a pipe between them. You put five gallons into the one on the right. You

put six gallons to the one on the left. What happens? They move. They're each five and a half.

MR. RATH: That's correct.

THE COURT: They're each five and a half gallons.

All right. Is that what -- that's what you're talking about basically, but they're not talking about that. They're saying it's a vacuum pump. You've got ten gallons. You've got five gallons on one side, you've got five gallons on the other side, and you suck the air out of the one on the right. What happens? The water flows. And if you put a spigot on it, the water would flow also. You get down to four gallons.

That's totally different from an ordinary pump that -- what you're talking about is speeding up the flow of water. The pump is speeding up the flow of water. That means of course that the water in the pump on the left is going to flow into the pump on -- into the chamber on the right.

MR. RATH: This is --

THE COURT: I don't get your argument. In other words, you're not -- you use the word "vacuum pump." All right. The difference between drinking a Coca-Cola from a glass and through a straw, I guess. But the water is going to -- you pump the water out of the receiving chamber, of course the water's going to flow out. But that's not anything close to a vacuum, and it's not anything close to the excavation of gas from a chamber. What it is is simple

gravity, like you yourself said. 1 2 MR. RATH: It's not just simple gravity, though, 3 Your Honor. It's creating a higher pressure differential 4 between the two sides. Their pump and our what we call the vacuum pump, okay, it's working the same way. 5 THE COURT: How does it create different pressure? 6 7 MR. RATH: It creates a lower pressure, relative 8 pressure in the pump box by removing water and causing -- and 9 pulling air into it to move the water. 10 THE COURT: Well, that's not anything close to a 11 vacuum as you yourself say, but that's simple hydraulics. 12 That's got nothing to do with the pump. It's got nothing to 13 do with the vacuum pump. It's -- anyway, Mr. Foster, where am 14 I wrong here? 15 MR. FOSTER: I can't -- you're right on. I did want 16 to point out one thing if I could. I brought Mr. Miller to do 17 one thing. Maybe he can hold this up for me. 18 THE COURT: Go ahead. Have you shown this to Mr. 19 Rath first? 20 MR. FOSTER: Yeah. This is just a figure. 21 THE COURT: Have you shown this to Mr. Rath? 22 MR. RATH: Well, I've seen this. This is from the 23 brief. 24 MR. FOSTER: It's from our brief. I want you to 25 hold this one up, Mark, I think.

What I want to tell you is you are absolutely right. A vacuum is going to pull it by air, the sucking of the straw. What they did to get around Carter -- and this is Carter, okay. You've got the tub where they're going to put the water in there. You have pipe 112, it's a pipe, and then you have the pump, and then you have the filters.

THE COURT: Stick right there, Mr. Rath. You'll get a chance with them. You get to use their chart too.

MR. FOSTER: Not a problem.

So what they did is they said -- they didn't say anything about the relative pressures or how fast fluid flows from one tub to the next. They said, We don't have this kind of a pump. We have a pump -- we don't have that. We have our pump right here and it's a vacuum pump, and we take with that air that you're talking about, we pull it through the filters with the vacuum pump.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FOSTER: We don't push it through the filters, and therefore, they said there are two whys. Why is that important? This is what they told the Patent Office to get their patent. They said because this pump, being an in-line pump, is going to have the junk coming here, it's going to, you know, stop the impellers. It will get clogged with debris, okay. If you vacuum it through the filters first, there's no debris. And this is important. This is really

hitting his issue.

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THE COURT: The same like you have in a heart pump, by the way.

MR. FOSTER: They said --

THE COURT: Well, that's the reason they have a vacuum -- you know, that's why they have the filters in a heart pump. But anyway, go ahead.

MR. FOSTER: Yeah. And then they said the second thing is this kind of a pump is big and you have to have -- in order for the fluid to drain from here to the sump, you have to have either the wash pad higher or you have to create a box for it to flow into. They were talking about the exact kind of flow that he wants to argue now is some kind of a vacuum pump, but at the end of the day they said, We pull it through with a vacuum pump, and commercial manufacturers of vacuum pumps thought this was not going to work. They were surprised. An in-line pump that they want to call a vacuum pump today, everybody knew about. It's well-established in the prior art, including in Carter. And there's just -- when you disclaim as they did here, you can't recapture it when somebody has the same kind of a pump that Carter did in-line with impellers that pushes the water through their filter. doesn't draw through, so I think you're dead on, Judge.

THE COURT: Hold it up for Mr. Rath.

MR. MILLER: I'm happy to hold it for Mr. Rath as

well.

MR. RATH: Well, sure you are based on what the Judge said, but I want to reiterate the point we were making to the Patent Office was both the placement and how it works. How it works is it pulls water through this tube from the pad to the filtering system, and that was the intention of this what we call the vacuum pump.

You know, at the end of the day a vacuum pump typically, like you said, removes air. It was probably the wrong terminology, but the way we tried to define it to the Patent Office was simply that was to move that water through the tube from the pad to the filters. And I would concede we did distinguish a pump that was right here at this pad, okay. There's no denying that. But the idea was that this pump was to move this water to the filtration system through a tube.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FOSTER: I just have one more thing to add,

Judge, just because I can't help myself. Hockerson v.

Halverson, this is -- Halberstadt, 222 F.3d 951, they made the same argument. Gee, that was the wrong terminology. That must have been a mistake the way we called it a vacuum pump.

THE COURT: Well, they called it that way more than once. I mean --

MR. FOSTER: This is what the Federal Circuit said: "Their argument therefore reduces to a request for a mulligan

that would erase from the prosecution history the inventor's disavowal of a particular aspect of a claim term's meaning. Such an argument is inimical to the public notice function provided by the prosecution history. The prosecution history constitutes the public record of a patentee's representations concerning the scope and meaning of the claims, and competitors are entitled to rely on those representations when ascertaining the degree of lawful conduct, such as designing around the claimed invention."

THE COURT: Well, final words, Mr. Rath?

MR. RATH: I don't disagree with the law, obviously, but I don't -- I've agreed, I believe, that there's been a disclaimer here. But I think what we did was define it, and we have a difference of opinion on how that term was defined.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, okay. You're going to have to find out if I can read my own handwriting here to a certain extent, I think.

Well, the disputed term is "vacuum pump for pumping a liquid through said tube from said drainage fitting to the filtering system." Hydro would say: "Vacuum to draw water from the fitting and through the filters rather than a pump to push the water through the filters." Petter says: "A pump located outside of the trough which utilizes suction to vacuum up wastewater from the washing process."

Well, in support of its arguments Petter emphasizes

the language of the claim itself: "vacuum pump." It's not a magic term of any kind. Hydro also notes that the single preferred embodiment described in the specification states that the "filtering system generally includes two vacuum pumps and a tank. Vacuum pumps suck the liquid through the hose from the drainage fittings on the various wash racks to the filtering system." Hydro contends that the specification requires a vacuum pump inside the filtering system to apply negative pressure to suck the water from the drainage fittings, through the hose, and into the filtering system.

Examiner originally rejected claim 1 on the grounds that it conflicted with the prior art, the Carter patent that we were just talking about. And Petter distinguished the Carter patent by noting that, quote: "utilizing a vacuum to draw the water from the fitting and draw the water through the filters rather than utilizing a pump located directly at the fitting for pushing the water through filters and the heater to the pressure washer is much more advantageous, since the water passes through all the stages of filters prior to reaching the vacuum. In the Carter patent pump 104 would be subject to continuous jamming of the impellers by debris rinsed off the object being washed. Furthermore, pumps, such as the pump 104 utilized in Carter, take up a considerable amount of space and require that the water flowing from the wash rack flow

downward into the pump. Such an arrangement would require the wash rack to either be elevated sufficiently or would require that the pump be provided in a well formed under or adjacent the wash rack. Thus, the use of a vacuum provides several advantages not offered by the pump used in the Carter patent."

Hydro contends that Petter cannot construe its claims, quote, "one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused infringers," end quote.

Computer Docking Station Corp. against Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d

1366 at 1375, Federal Circuit, 2008, quoting another case.

Petter emphasizes its argument that the specification describes a vacuum pump which "pumps a liquid through the tube from the drainage fitting to the filtering system," and notes that it states, quote, "vacuum pumps 70 suck the liquid through the hose 20 from the drainage fittings 34 to the various wash racks 12 to the filtering system 14." Petter argues that during prosecution it distinguished, quote, "a pump which utilized a vacuum to draw water from the drainage fitting from a pump that was located directly at the drainage fitting," end quote. This limitation, it contends, requires only that the pump be placed anywhere besides the trough or the drainage fitting.

As we've already discussed, the proffered constructions contain two fundamental differences: the location of the vacuum pump and the manner in which it acts

upon the liquid. "Pumping," taken alone, could compromise propulsion of a fluid through either positive or negative pressure. The fluid in question might enter the pump's intake and be expelled more rapidly from its exhaust. A pump might also be used to evacuate a gas-filled chamber, using the greater atmospheric pressure outside the chamber to draw the fluid in question into the chamber.

Under its ordinary meaning, a "vacuum pump" is understood by mechanical engineers to be, quote, "a compressor for exhausting air and noncondensable gases from a space that is to be maintained at subatmospheric pressure," end quote.

That's McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical

Terms (Mark Licker, publisher, Sixth Edition, 2003).

The Court must construe the disputed language by relying primarily upon intrinsic evidence. That's the Phillips case which even I am becoming familiar with at this stage in my life, 415 F.3d at 1321, 1324. Though the Court carries with it this general understanding of a vacuum pump, the construction of the term is not bound by this understanding. Instead, it will be molded by the use and context of the language of the claims, specifications, and prosecution history.

The first question, therefore, is whether Petter intended "vacuum pump," end quote and quote, to be understood according to its ordinary meaning within the art, or whether

it intended "vacuum pump" to encompass both devices that pump the liquid by acting directly upon the liquid as well as those that pump the liquid indirectly by evacuating a gas-filled chamber and relying on the greater atmospheric pressure to draw the liquid into the chamber. In other words, did Petter intend that "vacuum pump" actually include a broader class of pumps than indicated by the ordinary meaning of "vacuum pump" within the art?

The claim itself states only that the vacuum pump pumps the liquid. No other language in the claim reveals whether the pump does so through indirect or direct action upon the liquid. The specification describes a single preferred embodiment of the invention. That embodiment contains a, quote, "filtering system generally including two vacuum pumps and a tank," end quote. These, quote, "vacuum pumps suck the liquid into the tank 72," end quote. "Suck" has many definitions. However, the only one applicable in this context is "to draw water, air, et cetera, in some direction, especially by producing a vacuum." That's Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, 1989. This definition strongly suggests the creation of a vacuum, but it does not require that.

The specification warns that, quote, "draining fitting 34 should have a properly sized hole to ensure the greatest efficiency. If the hole has too large of a diameter,

the vacuum pumps pull on too much air, which is undesirable. If the hole has too small of a diameter, too low of a velocity of the liquid will result." When the drainage fitting is not filled with liquid, air enters the hose through the hole in the drainage fitting. That larger volumes of air entering the hose reduces the flow rate of the liquid indicates that the vacuum pumps remove air from the tank into which the liquid is pumped. The liquid is pushed into the hose toward the tank by the difference in atmospheric pressure and the air pressure inside the tank. Air entering the tank through the hose via the hole in the drainage fitting weakens the vacuum inside the tank, diminishing the pressure differential on which the pumping mechanism relies. However, too small a hole restricts the flow of liquid.

The preferred embodiment describes only a pump that evacuates a chamber and uses the air pressure differential to pump the water into the filter system. The Federal Circuit has made clear, however, that "absent a clear disclaimer in the description of the preferred embodiment, the fact that the inventor anticipated that the invention may be used in a particular manner does not limit the scope to that narrow context," end quote. That's Brookhill-Wilk 1, 334 F.3d at 1301. The admonition of this case prevents the Court from narrowing the ordinary meaning of a claim term where, quote, "the written description and prosecution history fail to

express a manifest exclusion or restriction limiting the claim term, and where the written description otherwise supports the broader interpretation," end quote. In this case, Petter asks the Court to ignore the limitation on, quote, "pump," end quote, imposed by the modifier "vacuum" in the claim itself, even though the specification provides ample evidence that Petter intended the limitation contained in the claims, and provides no evidence that "vacuum pump" was intended to be read more broadly than its ordinary meaning within the art.

The prosecution history further belies an expanded interpretation of the phrase. Petter argues that during prosecution it distinguished the pump claimed in the Carter patent only with respect to its location; i.e. that the Carter pump was located at the trough and the claimed Petter vacuum pump was not. However, as Hydro points out, Petter's request for amendment distinguished the pump in the Carter patent on additional grounds and with greater specificity than Petter now argues. Petter argued before the examiner that Carter did not teach or suggest a "vacuum pump for drawing water from the drainage fitting to a filtering system." This statement does not refer to the pump's location at all. Instead, it contrasts its operation with the Carter's pump.

Petter further distinguished a "vacuum to draw the water from the fitting and draw the water through the filters" from a "pump located directly at the fitting for pushing the

water through the filters." In neither statement did Petter specify the vacuum pump's location. In both, Petter highlighted the "vacuum" action of its pump, which "draws" the water to the filtering system -- and both of those should be in quotes, "vacuum" and "draws," by the way -- to the filtering system and contrasted it with the action of the Carter pump. Petter now contends, however, that it merely distinguished the pump's location without limiting the nature of its action. And I disagree with that, as I've said, for the reasons stated.

The contention is not only inconsistent with Petter's argument in its request for amendment, it is also undermined by Petter's explanation to the examiner of the advantages of its vacuum pump over the pump claimed in the Carter patent as was just pointed out in my judgment by Hydro. Petter noted that, quote, "utilizing a vacuum to draw the water from the fitting is much more advantageous," end quote, than, quote, "utilizing a pump located directly at the fitting for pushing water through filters since the water (drawn by a vacuum) passes through all the stages of filters prior to reaching the vacuum. The Carter pump would be subjected to continuous jamming of the impellers by debris," end quote. This advantage, by which Petter distinguishes the Carter patent, requires a vacuum pump which acts indirectly upon the liquid. Using a pump which acts directly upon the

liquid, as the Carter pump does, requires the liquid pass through the pump before it reaches the filter.

Petter also noted in its request for amendment that the Carter pump "requires that the water flowing from the wash rack flow downward into the pump. The wash rack must be elevated sufficiently or the pump must be in a well formed under or adjacent the wash rack." Of course, I've read all this before, but anyway, the gravamen of Petter's argument before the examiner was that the liquid must flow downhill via the gravitational force to reach a pump acting directly upon the liquid. Furthermore, to pump the liquid to the filter, the liquid must be accelerated by the pump before it reaches the filter. Using a pump which acts directly upon the liquid requires the liquid flow through the pump prior to reaching the filters. Petter argued to the examiner that its use of a vacuum pump to draw the liquid to the filter solved the shortcoming of the Carter patent.

Quote: "A patentee may limit the meaning of a claim term by making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution." Computer Docking, 519 F.3d at 1374. It may do so, quote, "by clearly characterizing the invention in a way to try to overcome rejections based on prior art," end quote. Same case. Petter explicitly limited the scope of its vacuum pump in precisely this fashion. Petter argues that this limitation applies only to the pump's location. However,

we've gone over that, but it relied not only on that fact, but also on the fact that its vacuum pump acts indirectly upon the liquid by evacuating a chamber and using the resulting air pressure differential to draw the water to the filter, while the Carter pump acts directly upon the liquid as it flows through the pump en route to the filter.

"Prosecution disclaimer does not apply to ambiguous disavowal." Computer Docking, 519 F.3d at 1375. A disavowal is ambiguous, quote, "if the applicant simply describes features of the prior art and does not distinguish the claimed invention based on those features," end quote, or if the specification, quote, "expressly defines a claim term and 'remarks made to distinguish claims from the prior art are broader than necessary,'" end quote. 3M Innovative Properties Company against Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1373, Fed. Circuit, 2003, quoting another case.

Neither circumstance was the case in Petter's prosecution. Petter expressly distinguished its claimed invention from the described features of the Carter patent. Petter's distinguishing remarks regarding its vacuum pump were not broader than necessary to distinguish the prior art, nor did they limit a claim described more broadly in its application. Consequently, the Court cannot give Petter's "vacuum pump" a broader construction than Petter gave it when it distinguished the prior art during prosecution. That's

Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1384. Now, just bear with me a minute
here.

Well, regarding the talk about the inventor's testimony and the hypothetical posed to Mr. Petter, I'm not going to concern myself with that because I think that the intrinsic evidence in the prosecution of this particular patent, '792 patent, is unambiguous. So there's no augmentation from the inventor that cuts one way or the other in my judgment. So for the foregoing reasons I'm going to adopt the -- although if I were writing it myself, I probably would have written it a little differently, but I'm going to adopt the proposed construction submitted by Hydro.

That brings us to the motion for summary judgment, and that, the parties agree that the construction that I just gave should lead to summary judgment on the complaint for Hydro. Just bear with me a minute.

Regarding the proposed construction by Petter and the argument that it worked by suction, I think quite frankly that that's the wrong use of the word "suction" under the circumstances of this case. As we talked about before, for example, if you had a spigot or you had water taken out of the second chamber, there would be a movement of the water, and that's the same thing that could occur with a motor in the second chamber, but that does not amount to suction. That amounts to gravity and water seeking its own level, which we

all learned about in probably the ninth-grade science class we all had to take and I hated at the time.

But anyway, removing water from the second box increases the flow rate, increases the velocity, but there certainly is no vacuum and no space has been evacuated, no gases have been evacuated from that chamber, so water moves from one container to the other by virtue of the difference in the weight of the water per unit. In other words, that's why it evens out at five and a half gallons in my prior example. I just don't get Petter's argument here.

But anyway, the action that is being talked about here cannot be regarded as a vacuum. Moving the water from the second container increases the flow rate, but any pump regardless of the action would create suction as it's defined by Petter. But that does not equate to a vacuum. That's true no matter how broadly that's construed.

So regarding the complaint, summary judgment will be entered on behalf of Hydro, and we will now go forward with the counterclaims under the circumstances that I outlined earlier; that is, that the parties get me the terms. Is fourteen days -- that ought to be sufficient. I mean, you got them to me already. You just have to nail down the ones that you want.

Okay. We're adjourned.

(Proceedings concluded at 11:07 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Kevin W. Gaugier, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the within-entitled and numbered cause on the date hereinbefore set forth.

I do further certify that the foregoing transcript was prepared by me.

/s/ Kevin W. Gaugier

Kevin W. Gaugier, CSR-3065 U.S. District Court Reporter 110 Michigan N.W. 622 Federal Building Grand Rapids, MI 49503